Catholic University Law Review
Volume 50
Issue 3 Spring 2001

Article 6

2001

"Saving" External Review from the Claws or ERISA Preemption
under Corporate Health v. Texas Department of Insurance
Lisa M. Campbell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Lisa M. Campbell, "Saving" External Review from the Claws or ERISA Preemption under Corporate Health
v. Texas Department of Insurance, 50 Cath. U. L. Rev. 785 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss3/6

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

NOTES
"SAVING" EXTERNAL REVIEW FROM THE
CLAWS OF ERISA PREEMPTION UNDER
CORPORATE HEALTH V. TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF INSURANCE
Lisa M. Campbell+
Historically, employers who provided health benefits to their
employees did so through insured health plans and fee-forservice arrangements. 1
States traditionally regulated the
insurers and protected participants and beneficiaries of health
insurance.2
With the evolution of various managed care
arrangements, states have attempted to regulate these new
entities.3
However, the managed care organizations' (MCO)
accountability to participants for health care decisions greatly
depends on whether the employer's health benefit plan is
covered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).4
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. Phyllis C. Borzi and Marc I. Machiz, ERISA and Managed Care Plans:
Key Preemption and Fiduciary Issues, ALI-ABA Course of Study 1, 2 (2000).
During the mid 1970s, most Americans did not have access to the wide variety
of managed care organizations that exist today, Id. at 20. An example of an
insured health plan includes the traditional Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance
coverage. Id. Fee-for-service is an arrangement in which insurance companies
or patients pay doctors fees based on the medical services provided. Corrine P.
Parver. & Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Liable: Assessing
Liability Under a Managed Health Care System, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 199, 201
(1999) (comparing traditional health care delivery systems to managed care).
2. Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 3; see also N.Y. State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)
(noting that states historically regulated health care).
3. See Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 2(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) (providing that ERISA preempts state laws that relate to
an employee benefit plan); see also Parver & Martinez, supra note 1, at 225
(noting that ERISA covers group benefit plans that provide medical benefits to
employees); infra note 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA
preemption of employee benefit plans). Under ERISA, participants in a group
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Over the past few years, bills protecting health care consumers
have dominated the agenda of both state and federal
legislatures.5
Enacting measures to protect health care
consumers invariably has been one of the most burdensome
tasks.6 This process requires lawmakers to balance the interests
of both high-quality and affordable health care for consumers
against cost-containment for employers and managed care
organizations.7 In addition, MCOs may not be subject to state
health care regulations because they offer an employee benefit
plan that falls under ERISA.8
More recently, commentators have agreed with the aggrieved
patients' claims against MCOs regarding health care decisions,
and argue that "ja]s states continue to tackle issues relating to
the quality of health care and its delivery mechanisms, the
potential for ERISA to preempt state efforts to improve health
access and outcomes is always a concern."9 Some state health
care protection laws include a provision for independent external
review of a MCO's treatment decisions, which the MCOs argue

health plan may only recover the benefit denied, which may be an inadequate
remedy if the patient has been seriously injured or has died due to the MCO's
negligence. Id. at 207; infra note 85 and accompanying text (describing ERISA's
remedial scheme).
5. Tracy E. Miller, Center Stage on the PatientProtection Agenda: Grievance
and Appeal Rights, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89 (1998) (regarding the shift to
managed care as a public concern that spurred legislation to offer patient
protections).
6. See Michael E. Ginsberg, HMO Grievance Processes, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 237, 237-38 (2000) (recounting the history of the health care system and
the overwhelming concerns Americans have about health care coverage in the
United States).
7. Id. at 238 (blaming the present quandary on employer-based health
insurance, which became an essential part of an employer's benefit package).
8. Id. at 240.
Since 1974, ERISA has protected participants and
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans by imposing disclosure and reporting
requirements, establishing standards of conduct for fiduciaries of plans, and
providing remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-46 (1987) (examining ERISA's provisions to
determine the preemptive effect Congress intended).
Participants and
beneficiaries who bring suit against MCOs argue that ERISA's preemption
provision, which preempts state law claims that "relate to" an employee benefit
plan, unfairly limits their rights and shields plans from state regulation. See
Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 2-3.
9. Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing that as the states attempt
to regulate managed care entities, employers, insurers, and providers have
begun to challenge state action by raising the issue of ERISA preemption).
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are preempted by ERISA.' 0
Generally, independent external review functions as a
grievance procedure that assesses a MCO's denial of medical
care. 11 Independent external review takes a significant step
toward MCO accountability. 12
This mechanism offers an
independent appeals process for the review of a denial of health
benefits and generally takes place after an internal review of the
denial.' 3
Objectivity and neutrality are 4the essential
characteristics of an independent external review.1
Independent external review is a relatively new process in the
administration of managed care. 5 Given the lack of clarity on
the subject of ERISA preemption of external review, the legal
community has expressed concern about whether the states
properly control independent review provisions under insurance
and contract law.' 6 Unfortunately, the courts must grapple with
10. Id;

infra note 44-50

and accompanying

text (examining ERISA

preemption of benefit plans). MOLLY STAUFFER AND RACHEL BEVINS MORGAN,
2001 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE LAw § 5-1 (Donald R. Levy ed.,

2001) (noting that there are 38 states that have independent external review
laws).
11. See Ginsberg, supra note 6, at 237 (describing Maryland's Health
Insurance-Complaint Process for Adverse Decisions and Grievances Act, which
establishes a two-tiered grievance process: an internal review conducted by an
HMO, followed by an external review process developed by the state); see also
STAUFFER AND MORGAN, supra note 10, at § 5-1 (highlighting the features of
various state independent review provisions).
12. See Ginsberg, supra note 6, at 242 (describing external review as an
opportunity for patients and doctors to challenge an insurer's decision to deny
care).
13. Id. (noting that a patient or physician may file an external appeal after
the internal review process approves a denial of care). HMO grievance statutes
generally require challenges of adverse determinations to be completed within
designated time periods to facilitate the review before an injury to the patient
occurs. See id. at 241-42.
14. See Amber M. Fischer, Note, The Viability of Congressional Efforts To
Create an Effective Appeals Processfor Health Care Consumers, 38 BRANDEIS
L.J. 89, 98 (1999) (stating that an external review provision may require that
the internal review process be completed before initiating the external review).
15. See Ginsberg, supra note 6, at 240. In 1978, Michigan became the first
state to initiate an external review process to settle disputes between plan
members and managed care entities. Id. Within the past few years, the
number of states with independent external review has nearly doubled.
Compare Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that twenty states provide
for external review of managed care

plan decisions),

with STAUFFER AND

MORGAN, supra note 10, at § 5-1 (acknowledging that thirty-eight states provide
for independent external review).
16. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 969-70 (7th Cir.
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this ambiguous area of the law while some state insurance
consumer protection schemes, such as external review, fail to
survive ERISA preemption. 17
The tension between state laws granting patients the right to
have an independent review of a medical necessity decision' 8 and
longstanding judicial interpretation of ERISA preemption as
exclusively regulating plan administration decisions forms the
crux of the issue.' 9 This tension collided recently in the case of
CorporateHealth Insurancev. Texas Department of Insurance.201
Corporate Health Insurance argued that ERISA's general
preemption clause preempted the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(THCLA).2' The district court determined that ERISA and the
Federal Employees Health Benefit Act (FEHBA) preempted the
provision of the THCLA that established an independent review
22
process.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
2000) (holding that the independent review provisions of the Illinois HMO Act
are, by law, incorporated into the plan as a.part of the insurance contract).
17. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 53839 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the external review provisions of the Texas
Health Care Liability Act (THCLA) create an alternative scheme through which
plan participants may seek benefits and, therefore, conflicts with ERISA's
exclusive remedy).
18. Ginsberg, supra note 6, at 240 (determining that "holding an HMO liable
for harmful denials of care remains extremely difficult").
19. See Borzi & Machiz, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing that ERISA
preemption challenges have been initiated against state external review laws).
20. See Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538-39 (analyzing Corporate Health's
challenge to the THCLA's external review provisions).
21. See generally Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 12 F.
Supp. 2d 597, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that ERISA and the Federal
Employees Health Benefit Act (FEHBA) preempted the THCLA); see also The
Health Care Liability Act, TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003
(Vernon Supp. 2001) (The THCLA's three main protections for health care
consumers include: (1) The Act allows Individuals to sue a MCO for failure to
exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions; (2) The Act
protects physicians from indemnity clauses and from retaliation by HMOs for
advocating medically necessary care for patients; and (3) The Act establishes
procedures for an independent review process for adverse benefit
determinations); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998); Federal
Employees Health Benefit Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996);
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (stating that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they... relate to any employee benefit plan").
22. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 625, 629 (holding that ERISA (and
FEHBA) preempted the independent review provisions of the THCLA because
they "improperly mandate the administration of employee benefits and
therefore, connect[ion] with ERISA plans"). The district court also held that
ERISA (and FEHBA) preempted the anti-retaliation and indemnification clauses
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court's decision, but analyzed the issue differently and held that
ERISA preempted an independent review scheme governing
coverage determinations.2 3
First, the appeals court determined that the independent
review provision "related to" ERISA plans.24 The court then
analyzed the independent review provision to determine if it
regulates the insurance business, and concluded that it affected
the insurance industry and, therefore, fell under ERISA's
exemption provision, which the court referred to as the "savings"
clause.
Notwithstanding survival from ERISA preemption
under the "savings" clause, the court went on to determine
whether ERISA still preempted the independent review
provisions because they conflicted with a substantive provision
of ERISA.
The court held that the independent review
provisions of the THCLA conflicted with ERISA's exclusive
remedy and, therefore, even if the provision fell under the
"savings" clause, ERISA would nevertheless preempt the
provision.2 7 The Fifth Circuit heard the State of Texas's petition
for panel rehearing.28 In July 2000, the court denied the motion
because they mandated certain benefit structures and, therefore, have a
"connection with" ERISA plans.
Id. at 627-28.
In contrast, the court
determined that ERISA (and FEHBA) did not preempt the provisions of the
THCLA that hold managed care entities liable for failing to exercise an ordinary
care standard for health care treatment decisions. Id. at 620.
23. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 539 (holding that ERISA (and FEHBA)
preempted the unlimited independent review provision because they created an
"alternative mechanism" through which a plan member can receive benefits
and, therefore, conflicted with ERISA's exclusive remedy). The Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court in part and held that ERISA did not preempt the
anti-retaliation and anti-indemnity provisions. Id. at 536.
24. Id. at 537 (stating that "an attempt to impose a state administrative
regime governing coverage determinations is squarely within the ambit of
ERISA's preemptive reach").
25. Id. at 537-38 (determining that the independent review provisions met
the common sense test of the insurance savings clause and satisfied two prongs
of the McCarran-Ferguson test; thus, the provisions were saved from
preemption).
26. Id. at 538 (stating that "our analysis does not end here, however,
because even if the provisions would otherwise be saved, they may nonetheless
be preempted if they conflict with a substantive provision of ERISA").
27. Id. (finding that the independent review provisions "establish a quasiadministrative procedure for the review of such denial and bind the ERISA plan
to the decision of the independent review organization"). The Fifth Circuit
severed the independent review provisions that conflicted with ERISA and
FEHBA from the THCLA. Id. at 540.
28. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 644-45
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for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc.29
Although this ruling applies to the Fifth Circuit, the impact of
the court's decision on the future of independent external review
of insurance companies and managed care entities' coverage
decisions remains uncertain.30 This decision raises important
health care reform questions because many states have enacted
similar external review provisions. 31 This recurring issue has
generated a split among the circuits. Congress also recognizes
the significance of independent review. Recent congressional
efforts to enact a Federal Patients' Bill of Rights, which includes
external review provisions, exemplifies the importance of these
processes for the protection of health care consumers. 33 The
preemption of the THCLA's independent review provision will
most likely trigger new apprehensions about the future of the

(5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the original panel decision, which provided that the
external review provisions of the THCLA bind the plan to pay for treatment that
the independent review mandates and, therefore, creates an alternative
mechanism for benefits). The Texas Department of Insurance argued that
rehearing should be granted on the basis of the recent Supreme Court decision,
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), in which the Court held that mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions were not fiduciary acts under ERISA. Id. at
643.
29. Id. at 643, 645 (reasoning that Pegram is not interpreted as saving all
state law claims that are based on a "mixed question of eligibility and
treatment").
30. See Marc I. Machlz, The Case for Seeking Supreme Court Review of
Corporate Health, 9 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1186 (July 27, 2000) (stating that
unless Congress passes legislation, the issue of ERISA preemption of external
review is likely to recur, because current federal law provides no external review
provisions).
31. Id.; see also Ginsberg, supra note 6, at 244-45 (acknowledging that in
light of Corporate Health, amendments to ERISA may be necessary to legitimize
state external review laws, specifically if external review binds the plan).
32. See CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538-39 (holding that the independent
review provisions create a mechanism through which plan members may seek
benefits due, and thus, conflicts with ERISA).
But see Moran v. Rush
Prudential HMO, 230 F.3d 959, 969-70 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
independent review does not conflict with ERISA by creating an alternative
remedy because It is Incorporated into the insurance contract as an additional
dispute resolution mechanism). In Moran, Judges Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook,
and Wood noted that the majority opinion "creates a square conflict with
another circuit, [which] is very probably unsound, and will affect an enormous
number of cases." Id. at 973 (Posner, J., dissenting).
33. See Fischer, supra note 14, at 90 (noting that, in 1997, President
Clinton supported the Patients' Bill of Rights, which included an external review
system).
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states' role in enforcing external review laws.34
This Note examines the THCLA's independent review
protection scheme in the context of ERISA preemption, and
particularly the issues brought to light in the panel decision of
Corporate Health Insurance v. Texas Department of Insurance.
First, this Note presents an overview of the THCLA's
independent review provisions. In order to place independent
review in its proper context within ERISA preemption, this Note
discusses case law interpreting ERISA preemption, specifically
the "savings" clause provision.
Further, this Note briefly
examines the most relevant cases leading up to Corporate
Health, which discuss the "savings" clause under ERISA. This
Note will then analyze Corporate Health and its likely impact on
independent review provisions.
Emphasizing the impact of
CorporateHealth, this Note addresses the current split between
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits regarding ERISA's preemption of
independent review. Finally, this Note concludes that major
flaws exist in the Fifth Circuit's preemption analysis of
independent review provisions in CorporateHealth, including the
court's primary reliance on dicta in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, a Supreme Court opinion, and its failure to properly
consider a recent Supreme Court case, Pegram v. Herdrich.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN STATE INDEPENDENT REVIEW LAWS AND
ERISA PREEMPTION
A.

The Texas Health CareLiability Acts's Independent Review
Provisions

The statute challenged in Corporate Health was the THCLA.3 5
34. See Machiz, supra note 30, at 1188 (noting that it is likely that the issue
of ERISA preemption of external review provisions will recur because of its
public significance).
35. The Health Care Liability Act, TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
88.001-88.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Two provisions other than the
independent review provisions of the THCLA that the court discussed, but that
are not essential to this analysis, are the liability provisions and the antiretaliation and anti-indemnification provisions. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at
534-36. The liability provisions create a cause of action for damages against
insurance carriers, HMOs, or other managed care entities for their own
substandard treatment decisions or those of their agents. See §§ 88.002(a), (b).
The anti-retaliation and anti-indemnification provisions prohibit insurance
carriers, HMOs, or other managed care entities from terminating their business
arrangements with providers if the providers advocate on behalf of patients,
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Maintenance

Organization (HMO) Act 3 6 to grant HMO members the right to a

review by an independent review organization (IRO)Y. An IRO
reviews an HMO's decision to deny coverage for medical
treatment based on its determination that the procedure is not
medically necessary or appropriate.38
The THCLA requires HMO complaint procedures to notify an
enrollee of the right to appeal an adverse determination to an
IRO and to advise the enrollee of the procedure for such an
appeal.
In addition, the THCLA provides that evidence of
coverage under a health care plan must describe the HMO's
methods of resolving complaints, "including the enrollee's right
to appeal denials of an adverse determination.., to an [IRO]. '4 °
The THCLA also states that the IRO provisions governing
utilization review agents 4' apply to an HMO. 42 Under these
provisions, the HMO must comply with the IRO's determination
of medical necessity, thus, the IRO's determination binds the
HMO regarding the determination that care is medically
protect a wide range of provider advocacy, including the activity of a physician
in persuading medical personnel to provide appropriate and medically
necessary health care, and prohibit insurance carriers, HMOs, or other
managed care entities from entering into contracts with providers that require
providers to indemnify the insurance carriers, HMOs, or other managed care
entities from liability for the insurance carriers, HMOs, or other managed care
entities' own conduct under the Act. See §§ 88.002(0, (g).
36. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A (Vernon 1999). The HMO Act is part of the
Insurance Code. See id.
37. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.09(e)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (requiring
plans to provide information about an "enrollee's right to appeal denials of an
adverse determination" to an independent review organization); see also id. art.
20A. 12A (describing the process for appealing adverse determinations, which
the THCLA requires HMOs to implement).
38. Id. arts. 20A.09(e)(4), 20A. 12A (setting forth the text of the Act).
39. Id. arts. 20A. 12A(a)(1), (2), (3) (defining terms relevant to this section).
An "adverse determination" is a "determination by [an HMO] ... that the health
care services furnished or proposed to be furnished to an enrollee are not
medically necessary or are not appropriate." Id. art. 20A. 12A(a)(1).
40. Id. art. 20A.09(e)(4) (setting forth the text of the Act).
41. Id. art. 21.58A(6)(b)(6)(c). This provision states that "[nlotwithstanding
this article or any other law, in a circumstance involving an enrollee's lifethreatening condition, the enrollee is entitled to an immediate appeal to an
independent review organization

. . . and is not required to comply with

procedures for an internal review of the utilization review agent's adverse
determination." Id.
42. Id. art. 20A. 12A(b) (requiring an HMO to implement and maintain an
Internal appeals system).
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43

necessary.

B. ERISA Preemption:The Shield Limiting State Law Protections
1. ERISA's "Relates to" Test
ERISA, a comprehensive federal statute, regulates employee
pension and welfare plans.4 4 ERISA's expansive regulation of
employee welfare and pension benefit plans extends to group
health plans that provide health care or benefits for plan
participants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of
insurance.4 5 To accomplish this goal, Congress retained broad
federal regulatory authority by enacting the ERISA preemption
provision. 46
The Supreme Court described the ERISA
preemption provision as having three distinct parts: the
"preemption" clause, the "savings" clause, and the "deemer"
clause.4
The preemption clause in ERISA § 514(a) preempts any state
law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan. 48 Congress failed
to define "relates to" in ERISA, and the Supreme Court
historically applied ERISA § 514(a) broadly. 49 The Court has
43. Id. art. 21.58A(6A)(3). This provision requires that a utilization review
agent must "comply with the independent review organization's determination
with respect to the medical necessity or appropriateness of health care items
and services for an enrollee." Id.
44. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) & (2)(A) (1994). An employee pension
plan is "any plan, fund, or program .

.

. established or maintained by an

employer or by an employee organization . . .[that] provides retirement income
to employees, or results in a deferral of income by employees for periods
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond."
Id. §
1002(2)(A). An employee welfare benefit plan is defined as a plan, fund, or
program established by an employer or employee organization, or both, to
provide benefits such as medical, surgical, or hospital care, sickness or
disability, accident or death benefits. Id. § 1002(1).
45. Id. § 1002(1).

46. ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
47. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
732-33 (1985).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. If
a state regulation in any way "relates to" an ERISA plan, ERISA preemption is
raised by providers or insurance entities to escape liability and remove the case
to federal court where the remedies are more limited. See Borzi & Machiz,
supra note 1, at 3.
49. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990)
(concluding that ERISA preempts the wrongful discharge claim because it
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interpreted "relates to" by giving it a "common sense meaning,"
finding that a state law relates to an employee benefits
plan "if it
50
plan."
a
such
to
reference
or
with
connection
a
has
Over time, the Court has explored the expansive character of
ERISA preemption and limited its broad sweep. 5' In New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,52 the Supreme Court recognized that prior
attempts to construe the phrase "relates to" does not give the
Court "much help [in] drawing the line" to ascertain whether
ERISA preempts a state law. In Travelers, a New York statute
required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by
a commercial insurer and certain HMOs, but not from patients
insured under Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.54 The Supreme

relates to pension benefits, as well as to the pension plan itself); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempts a Pennsylvania
antisubrogation law because it "relates to" employee benefit plans); Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (holding that
ERISA preempted the Georgia garnishment statute because the law expressly
referred to ERISA plans); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97
(1983) (holding that state laws making unlawful plan provisions that
discriminate and requiring plans to provide specific benefits "relate to" employee
benefit plans).
50. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95-97 (holding that Congress intended for ERISA's
broad preemption provision to preempt any state law that "relate[d] to" an
employee benefit plan, not merely those state laws that directly conflicted with a
substantive provision in the federal statute). In Shaw, the Court noted the
broad scope of the preemption clause and held that the New York Human
Rights Law and that State's Disability Benefits Law related to welfare plans
governed by ERISA. Id. at 97. The phrase "relates to" was given its broad
common sense meaning so that a state law "relate[s] to" a benefit plan "in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it connects with or refers to such a plan." Id.
The preemption provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within
its jurisdiction, even Including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements. Id. at 98-99. For more case law interpretations see
generally supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51. For more case law interpretations see N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662, 668 (1995)
(holding that ERISA did not preempt hospital surcharges because they did not
directly "relate to" employee benefit plans).
52. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
53. Id. at 655 (reasoning that "[ilf
'relate to' were taken to extend to the
furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for '[rleally, universally, relations stop
nowhere"') (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's
Classics (1980)).
54. Id. at 649.
Several commercial insurers brought this action to
invalidate the surcharge statutes. Id. at 651-52.
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Court held that the surcharges did not "relate to" employee
benefit plans because Congress did not intend to insulate laws
with an "indirect economic effect on the relative costs of various
health insurance packages" and, therefore, ERISA did not
preempt them.5 5
The Court limited the preemption landscape and clarified that
in determining whether ERISA preempts a state law, a court
should begin by presuming that Congress did not want to
preempt a state's historic police powers in areas such as medical
care, unless a "clear and manifest" intent to the contrary
56
exists.
Any other conclusion would bar all state regulations of
hospital costs, and preempt all laws with indirect economic
effects on ERISA plans.
Later cases adopted Travelers's

55. Id. at 662. The Court carefully emphasized its holding did not suggest
that ERISA preempted only direct regulation. See id. at 668.
56. Id. at 654-55, 661 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)). The trend established by Travelers, which moved away from a
presumption in favor of ERISA preemption continued in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & Clinical Services Fund. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical
Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997). The Court, once again, limited the scope of
ERISA's preemption powers. See id. at 809. In De Buono, the Court considered
"whether the opaque language in ERISA's § 514(a) precludeId] New York from
imposing a gross receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by
ERISA funds." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court noted that prior to Travelers, it
had been unnecessary to explore the expansive character of ERISA's
preemption language because the state laws at issue in prior cases had a clear
connection to ERISA plans. Id. at 813. The majority in De Buono concluded
that the New York law in question was one of the "'myriad state laws' of general
applicability that impose[d] some burdens on the administration of ERISA
plans, but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them within the meaning of the
governing statute." Id. at 815.
In California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., the Supreme Court reinforced some of the crucial points of
its decision in Travelers. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). In Dillingham, the Court employed
the same analytic approach it used in Travelers, and held that California's
prevailing wage law neither refers to nor has a "connection with" ERISA plans,
does not "relate to" ERISA plans and, thus, is not preempted by ERISA. See id.
at 334. Similar to New York's hospital surcharge regulation in Travelers,
California's apprenticeship standards and the wages paid on state public works
have long been regulated by the states. Id. at 330. The Dillingham Court
reasoned that "pre-emption of traditionally state-regulated substantive law in
those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be 'unsettling."' Id.
57. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664-65 (acknowledging that the finding of
ERISA preemption for the hospital surcharges would be "unsettling" because
several states, at the time of the enactment of ERISA regulated hospital
charges).
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presumption against ERISA preemption.5 8
2. ERISA "Savings"Clause: Exception to ERISA Preemption
ERISA's insurance "savings" clause substantially qualifies
preemption. 59 The "savings" clause functions so that ERISA does
not preempt a state law if it regulates the insurance, banking, or
securities industries.6 °
To assist in further defining the
insurance exception, the Court looked to Congress's indication
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act 6 1 that federal laws do not preempt
state laws that "regulat[e] the business of insurance."62 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not contain language suggesting
63
any limitation on the definition of the "business of insurance.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,64 the
Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act and identified three criteria relevant to determining whether
a particular practice falls within ERISA's "business of
insurance. ,65
Metropolitan Life involved a Massachusetts statute that
required insurers to provide a specified package of mental health
benefits to any Massachusetts resident who was insured under
a general insurance policy, an accident or sickness insurance
policy, or an employee health -benefit plan.66 The Court rejected
the insurer's argument that Congress only intended to save
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). This exception
for insurance regulation is limited by the deemer clause. See ERISA § 514(c),
29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (1994).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking or securities." Id.; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
mandating mental health benefits coverage "related to" ERISA plans, but was
nevertheless saved from preemption by operation of the savings clause).
61. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
63. MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 736-37.
64. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
65. See id. at 743 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. id.
119, 129 (1982)) (holding that application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
criteria suggests that mandated benefit laws amount to state regulation of the
"business of insurance" and, therefore, saved it from preemption); see also
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
66. MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 727.
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traditional insurance laws, not health laws that are implemented
67
through insurance contracts.
Instead, the Court referred to
cases interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to
determine the meaning of the "business of insurance." 68 The
criteria the Court developed include: "first, whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance
69
industry.
More recently, the Court returned to the question of whether a
challenged state law regulated the "business of insurance" and
focused on the issue of whether a state law must satisfy all three
McCarran-Ferguson factors, as well as meet the common sense
test, in order to be saved from preemption.
In UNUM Life
Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,71 the Court "reject[ed] [the]
assertion that a state regulation must satisfy all three
McCarran-Ferguson factors in order to 'regulate insurance'
under ERISA's saving clause. 7 2
UNUM Life Insurance involved
an action to recover disability benefits.7 3 The plaintiff received
no information about obtaining coverage under the disability
plan, even though he notified the human resources department
about his disability in a timely fashion.7 4 The plaintiff later
found a booklet describing his right to receive disability benefits
and applied for coverage under the disability policy. 7 5 The

67. Id. at 741.
68. See generally supra note 65 and accompanying text..
69. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
70. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373-74 (1999)
(holding that a state regulation is not required to satisfy all three McCarranFerguson factors in order to regulate insurance).
71. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
72. Id. at 373. The Court "has] indicated that the McCarran-Ferguson
factors are 'considerations [to be] weighed' in determining whether a state law
regulates insurance." Id.; see also Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d,
939, 946 (9th Cir. 1998) (looking to the McCarran-Ferguson factors as
"guideposts, not separate essential elements ... that must each be satisfied" to

save the state's law).
73. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 363. The disability benefit in dispute was a longterm group disability policy issued by UNUM to Management Analysis Company
(MAC), the company that employed the plaintiff. Id. at 364.
74. Id. at 365.
75. Id.
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insurance company denied the plaintiff coverage because he
failed to comply with the plan's notice requirement in a timely
76
manner.
The plaintiff sued for benefits under ERISA § 502.77 The Court
ruled that California's notice-prejudice rule, which precludes
any insurer from denying a claim for benefits on the grounds of
timeliness unless the insurer proves that it has been prejudiced
by the untimely filing, did not conflict with ERISA § 502(a) even
though the effect of the rule was to bind the plan to pay
benefits.78 In addition, the insurance company argued that the
notice prejudice rule conflicted with ERISA § 503.79 The Court
held that this rule did not conflict with ERISA § 503 because it
allowed a greater time period to file than the federal law and,
therefore, complements ERISA. 80
3. The "deemer"clause
The "deemer" clause limits the "savings" clause and prevents
states from circumventing the general prohibition on state

76. Id.
77. Id. The relevant ERISA provision states that a civil action may be
brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (1994).
78. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 377. California's notice-prejudice rule states that
"[a] defense based on an insured's failure to give timely notice [of a claim]
requires the insurer to prove that it suffered substantial prejudice."' Id. at 366.
In UNUM, the Court refers to amicus curiae by the Solicitor General of the
United States in which the Solicitor General qualified the argument advanced in
Pilot Life that ERISA § 502 Is exclusive. Id. at 377. The Solicitor General
asserted that the discussion of ERISA § 502(a) in Pilot Life "'does not in itself
require that a state law that 'regulates Insurance,' and so comes within the
terms of the savings clause, is nevertheless preempted if it provides a state-law
cause of action or remedy."' Id. at 377 n.7 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae
Solicitor General of the United States at 25, UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward,
526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868)). The Solicitor General went on to note that
"'the insurance savings clause, on its face, saves state law conferring causes of
action or affecting remedies that regulate insurance, just as it does state
mandated-benefit laws."' Id. The Court in UNUM contended that they need not
address the Solicitor General's argument because the plaintiff in this case sued
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits due, "and seeks only the application of
saved state insurance law as a relevant rule of decision in his § 502(a) action."
Id.
79. Id. at 377; see also ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994) (requiring
welfare benefit plans to provide notice and opportunity for review of denied
claims).
80. See UNUM, 526 U.S. at 377.
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The "deemer" clause
regulation of employee benefit plans.8
prevents states from regulating employee benefit plans under
the guise of regulating insurance.82
4. ERISA's Limited Remedial Scheme
ERISA also establishes a civil enforcement scheme. 3 ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme is the remedial scheme ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries utilize to bring a cause of action
for improper denial of a claim for benefits. 4 Under the civil
enforcement provisions of ERISA's § 502(a), a plan participant or
beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan,
enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or clariiy rights
to future benefits. 85
The Supreme Court took a two-step approach to ERISA
preemption analysis in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.Dedeaux 6 a
disability case involving § 502 and § 514 of ERISA that struck
down a Mississippi bad faith law providing remedies and other
protections for consumers.8 7 The plaintiff in Pilot Life brought
three state common law tort and contract actions against Pilot
Life Insurance Company asserting bad faith processing of his

81. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994). The deemer
clause provides that "an employee benefit plan ... shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of
insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies." Id.
82. See d.
83. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
84. Id.; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1987)
(determining that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme is "sandwiched between two
other ERISA provisions relevant to enforcement of ERISA and to the processing
ERISA § 501
of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan").
authorizes criminal penalties for violations of the reporting and disclosure
provisions of ERISA. ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994). ERISA § 503
requires every employee benefit plan to comply with Department of Labor
regulations by notifying any participant or beneficiary who is denied benefit
claims as well as affording a reasonable opportunity for review of the decision
denying the claim. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994).
85. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1132; see also PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 53
(determining that relief under ERISA § 502(a) "may take the form of accrued
benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an
injunction against a plan administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits").
86. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
87. See id. at 48, 57 (determining that ERISA preempted the Mississippi
Bad Faith law because it related to an ERISA plan and was not saved by the
insurance savings clause).
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benefit claims and seeking general and punitive damages. 8 The
Court determined that the common law causes of action, based
on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an
employee benefit plan, undoubtedly satisfied the criteria for the
"relates to" test under the first prong of preemption in ERISA §
514(a).8 9 The Court then considered whether the Mississippi law
regarding bad faith "regulates insurance" and was thus saved
from preemption by ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). 90 The Court first
considered the common sense understanding of the "savings"
clause, 9' and found that it was unable to determine whether
these laws would affect only the insurance industry.9 2 The Court
then looked to the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the
"business of insurance,"93 and concluded that the state law met
none of the McCarran-Ferguson criteria.9 4
The Court
determined, therefore, that the state cause of action asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISAregulated plan was not saved as a law regulating the "business
of insurance" by ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), and, therefore, was
preempted by ERISA § 514(a).95
Although this finding sufficiently resolved the matter, the
Court went on to discuss whether ERISA § 502(a) was an
exclusive remedy provision.96 The Court reasoned that Congress
88. Id. at 43. In the original complaint, the plaintiff asserted three causes
of action: torttous breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duties; and fraud in
the inducement. Id. The plaintiff sought damages for failure to provide benefits
under the policy, general damages for mental and emotional distress and other
incidental damages, and punitive and exemplary damages. Id. at 43.
89. Id. at 48.
90. Id.: see also id. at 48 & n. 1 (explaining that the savings clause covers
'"any law of any State:"' and "'[tihe term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State"')

(quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(c)(1)-(2) (1994)).
91. Id. at 50 (describing the common sense view of the word "'regulates' as
"a law that must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must
be specifically directed toward that industry").
92. Id. (finding that the roots of the Mississippi law of bad faith are "firmly
planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law").
93. Id. at 50-51: see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
94. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50-51 (determining that the
Mississippi common law of bad faith "does not effect a spreading of policyholder
risk": "does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the
insured"; and "has developed from general principles of tort and contract law").
95. Id. at 57 (concluding that ERISA preempted the Mississippi common law
of bad faith because it failed the savings clause test).
96. Id. at 52. 'The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive Is
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did not intend to provide remedies to ERISA beneficiaries in
addition to those specified in ERISA § 502(a).9 7 The Court relied
on the "clear expression of congressional intent that ERISA's

civil enforcement scheme be exclusive."9 8
5. "Mixed Eligibility Decisions"

The most recent Supreme Court decision interpreting ERISA,
9
though not a preemption case, is Pegram v. Herdrich.
Dr.
Pegram examined plaintiff Herdrich and discovered a large,

supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil enforcement
provisions, and, second, by legislative history ....
" Id.; see also Massachusetts
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (observing that "[tlhe
six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of ERISA.
• . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly"); ERISA § 502(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999). Section 1132(a) provides that:
A civil action may be brought
(1) by a participant or beneficiary (A) for the relief provided for in
subsection (c) of this section [concerning requests to the administrator
for information], or (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; (2) by the
Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title [breach of fiduciary duty]; (3) by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan; (4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or
beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of
this title [information to be furnished to participants]; (5) except as
otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this subsection, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2), (4),
(5), or (6) of subsection (i) or (1)
of this section.
Id.; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54 (extending this finding by
determining that "[tihe deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement
remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement
remedies were intended to be exclusive").
97. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54. Congress declared that the preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provision
in § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). See 61 Stat.
156 (1947) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994)).
98. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 57.
99. 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that fiduciary acts under ERISA do
not encompass mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by the HMO).
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inflamed mass in her abdomen.'0 0
Dr. Pegram ordered
diagnostic testing eight days later at the HMO's affiliated
hospital several miles away, rather than the same day at a local
hospital. 0 '
Before her appointment at the HMO hospital,
Herdrich's appendix ruptured and caused a severe abdominal
infection.'0 2 Herdrich claimed that under ERISA's fiduciary
provisions, the HMO's physician financial incentives scheme
violated ERISA's fiduciary requirements. 0 3 Herdrich argued that
these incentives encouraged doctors to make medical decisions
that financially
benefited the doctors at the expense of their
0 4
patients.'
The Court unanimously held that mixed treatment and
eligibility decisions by an HMO, acting through its physicians,
are not fiduciary acts under ERISA, and, therefore, ERISA does
not preempt these decisions.'° 5 The Pegram decision exemplifies
the Court's continued redevelopment of the boundaries of ERISA
preemption.

06

II. CORPORATE HEALTH: TEARING DOWN A STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION SCHEME

Corporate Health Insurance sued the Texas Department of
Insurance (the Department) in Corporate Health v. Texas
Department of Insurance.'0 7 Corporate Health Insurance sought

100. Id. at 215.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 216.
104. Id. at 213.
105. Id. at 237.
106. George Parker Young, Analysis & Perspective:ERISA Federal Preemption
of HMO Lawsuits: New Case Law, 9 Health L. Rep. (3NA) 1267 (Aug. 10, 2000).
The "redevelopment of ERISA preemption analysis [began] with Justice Souter's
earlier unanimous opinion in Travelers, followed by the Court's DeBuono and
Dillingham decisions ('the Trilogy')." Id.; see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
107. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1998). The plaintiffs included
Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., Aetna Health Plans of Texas, Inc., Aetna
Health Plans of North Texas, Inc., and Aetna Life Insurance Company
(hereinafter "Corporate Health"). See id. The defendants included the Texas
Department of Insurance, Elton Bomer, Commissioner of the Texas Department
of Insurance, and Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas, in their
official capacities. See id. In response to Corporate Health's challenge to the
THCLA, the Department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
to dismiss suit against the Department and the Commissioner as improper
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a declaration that ERISA and FEHBA preempted the THCLA,
and an injunction against enforcement of the Act.' °8
The
Department argued that the THCLA "regulates the quality of
care provided by HMO[s] operating in Texas," in contrast to
regulating how HMOs make coverage determinations or
structure benefit plans that are governed by ERISA.' 09
Corporate Health argued that ERISA preempted the THCLA
because it "relates to" an employee benefit plan, defined as
having a connection with an ERISA plan."1
The plaintiffs
claimed that the THCLA has a "connection with" ERISA plans by
imposing liability on ERISA plans, mandating and administering
the structure of plan benefits, binding administrators to
independent review decisions, and creating an alternative
remedy. "'
The district court concluded that independent review of
adverse benefit determinations amounted to an improper
administration of benefits and that ERISA preempted the IRO
provisions.' 2 A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reviewed

parties. Id. at 603. The Department argued that the THCLA regulates the
quality of care provided by HMOs, not the regulation of benefits or coverage
determinations, and, therefore, ERISA preemption and FEHBA preemption do
not apply to the THCLA. Id. At the hearing on the Department's motion to
dismiss, the district court converted the Department's motion into a motion for
summary judgment. Id. The court dismissed the Department from the suit
because it found that the Department operated as an arm of the State of Texas
and was, therefore, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 605. The
court agreed with Corporate Health that the Commissioner's "(responsib[ilityl
for ensuring compliance with . . . the establishment and supervision of

independent review organizations qualified him as a proper party." Id. at 606
(quoting Plaintiffs' Motion, Instrument No. 20 at 5). In addition, the court cited
other cases when the Commissioner has been a named defendant. Id.
108. Id. at 602. The THCLA contains provisions addressing: liability of
health insurance carriers, HMOs, or other managed care entities; antiretaliation and anti-indemnification; and independent review for adverse benefit
determinations. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (Vernon
Supp. 2001).
109. CorporateHealth, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (quoting Defendants' Summary
of Argument, Instrument No. 25 at 1). Corporate Health filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that the THCLA "'impermissibly interferes with
the purpose, structure and balance of ERISA and FEHBA, thereby injecting
state law into an area exclusively reserved for Congress."' Id. (quoting Plaintiffs'
Summary of Argument, Instrument No. 21 at 1).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 625. In addition, the district court concluded that the THCLA
"does not constitute an improper imposition of state law liability" and survives
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the decision and affirmed in part and reversed in part." 3
A. Fifth CircuitHolds That ERISA Preempts the IRO Provisions
The Fifth Circuit panel addressed the issue of whether ERISA4
preempted the THCLA's provisions for independent review."
The court analyzed the IRO provisions as two distinct parts:
limited independent review and unlimited independent review." 15
The limited independent review provisions require an
independent review in order for a patient to sue an entity." 6 The
ERISA preemption so long as the suit challenges the quality of care received,
and Is not made in the context of a benefit determination. Id. at 620.
113. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 540 (5th
Cir. 2000). On appeal, the Department argued that Corporate Health lacked
standing to challenge the THCLA's liability provisions because it had not
suffered the requisite injury. Id. at 532. The Department conceded that
Corporate Health had standing to challenge the other provisions. Id. Corporate
Health contended that it had standing because the THCLA's liability provision
exposes it to suits by private parties and the Attorney General. Id. The Texas
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, upholding the liability
provisions of the THCLA, and recognized that the liability provision only allowed
claims that challenge the quality of health care, not a coverage dispute, and,
thus, are not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 535.
The court agreed with the Department's argument that the THCLA
excluded a duty to provide treatment for benefits not covered by the plan. Id. at
534. The court stated that the liability provisions do not relate to ERISA plans
because they are indifferent to whether the plan operates under ERISA and
their operation does not rely on the existence of an ERISA plan. Id. Congress
did not intend for ERISA to supplant state law regulating the quality of medical
care. Id. at 535.
The second question the court addressed asked whether ERISA
preempted the anti-retaliation and anti-indemnification provisions of the
THCLA. Id. at 535-36. Corporate Health argued that these provisions dictated
the administration and structure of ERISA plans because they would limit their
ability to contract with doctors. Id. at 536. The court disagreed and held that
these provisions regulate the terms on which the health care provider contracts
with its agents, in contrast to mandating entities to provide substantive levels of
coverage.
Id. Moreover, the court determined that this quality of care
regulation has traditionally been left to the states. Id. Thus, the court reversed
the district court's decision and held that ERISA did not preempt the antiretaliation or the anti-indemnification provisions. Id. at 540.
114. Id. at 536.
115. Id. at 536-37; see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003
(Vernon Supp. 2001) (describing limited independent review); TEX. INS. CODE
arts. 20A.09(e), 20A. 12A (Vernon Supp. 2001) (listing amendments to the HMO
Act); TEx. INS. CODE arts. 21.58A, §§ 6(b), 6A (Vernon Supp. 2001) (including
amendments to the Utilization Review Agent Act) (describing unlimited
independent review).
116. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 536; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 88.003 (requiring "affected" insureds to exhaust all applicable
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limited independent review also restricts itself to claims for
which patients may sue under the liability provisions.' 17 The
court held that ERISA did not preempt the limited independent
review provisions because any duty for independent review
imposed on the managed care entities is limited to the extent of
the liability provisions.1 18
The second classification of independent review is the
unlimited independent review provisions. 119 Such provisions add
procedures to allow consumers to appeal adverse coverage
determinations
and to bind
the independent
review
organization's determination of medical necessity on the
managed care entity. 20 The court interpreted this provision to
allow a patient who was denied coverage to appeal to an external
organization, thereby imposing a state administrative scheme
that governs coverage determinations. 12 1

Foregoing detailed

analysis explaining how the independent review provision
"relates to" an ERISA plan, the court concluded that this
determination places the independent review provision "squarely
within the ambit of ERISA's preemptive reach."'122 This approach
was reminiscent of the Supreme Court's broad reading of the
"relates to" analysis that would preempt virtually any state
law. 123

appeals before instituting action).
117. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 536. The limited independent review
provision describes the patient's complaint as "the claim," which allows
independent review only of claims for which patients may bring suit under the
liability provisions. Id.; see also TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003.
118. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 536-37.
In addition, the 1999
amendments to this provision make the review "voluntary on the entity's part."
Id. at 537. The entity, therefore, could not argue that the provision conflicts
with its duties under ERISA. Id.; see also TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
88.003(a), (c).
119. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 537; TEX. INS. CODE arts. 20A.09(e),
20A.12A (including amendments to the HMO Act); TEx. INS. CODE arts. 21.58A,
§§ 6(b), 6A (including amendments to the Utilization Review Agent Act).
120. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 537.
See TEx. INS. CODE art.
20A. 12A(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (defining adverse determination); TEx. INS.
CODE art. 21.58A § 6A(3) (requiring the utilization review agent to comply with
the independent review organization's determination).
121. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 537.
122. Id.
123. See Young, supra note 106, at 1277 (suggesting that "without very
much analysis at all, [Judge Higginbotham] simply concludes that the IRO
regime 'is squarely within the ambit of ERISA's preemptive reach'").
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The court continued the preemption analysis to determine if
the independent review provisions fell under ERISA's "savings"
clause as laws regulating the "business of insurance."'2 4 The
court applied the common sense test and considered the three
McCarran-Ferguson factors as guideposts.125
The court
determined that the independent review provisions met the
"savings" clause's common sense test because they aimed at
insuring
entities
and
regulating
the
insured-insurer
126
relationship.
In addition, the provisions satisfied two of the
three McCarran-Ferguson factors,
which was sufficient to fall
2
under the "savings" clause.

1

The court took the analysis one step further, suggesting that
even if the independent review provisions would be saved, they
may still be preempted if they conflict with a substantive
provision of ERISA.128 The court relied on the Supreme Court's
Pilot Life decision,129 in which the Court interpreted Congress's
intent regarding the exclusivity of ERISA's enforcement scheme
to preempt not only remedial schemes that directly conflict with
30
ERISA, but supplemental state law remedies as well.
Accordingly, the Corporate Health court held that ERISA
preempted the unlimited independent review provisions because
they created an "alternative mechanism through which plan
members may seek benefits due them under the terms of the
plan," and Congress intended ERISA § 502(a) to be the exclusive

124. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 537.
125. Id.; see also UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 374
(1999) (considering whether the rule regulates insurance as a common sense
matter, and looking to the three McCarran-Ferguson factors as guideposts);
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985)
(interpreting the savings clause as Congress's intentional reservation of state
insurance regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
126. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538. The common sense test measures
whether the law is specifically directed toward the insurance industry and
considers whether it plays an integral part in the policy relationship between
the insured and the insurer. UNUM Life, 526 U.S. at 368.
127. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538 (noting that these factors are integral
to the policy relationship between the insurer and insured and they regulate the
insurance industry).
128. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538.
129. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
130. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538-39 (relying on the Pilot Life Court,
which interpreted Congress's intent regarding the exclusivity of ERISA's
enforcement scheme very broadly). ERISA's enforcement provisions are set out
at 29 U.S.C. §1132; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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remedy. 3 '
B. Petitionfor RehearingDenied: A Primerfor Supreme Court
Review
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Department
petitioned for a rehearing and a rehearing en banc, but a
quorum of the Fifth Circuit denied the request. 32
The
Department argued that the Fifth Circuit misunderstood the IRO
provisions and failed to consider the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Pegrarn' 133 As Judge Higginbotham noted, while the
Department's argument is "not without some persuasive force, it
does not comport with our view of the record.' 34 The court held
that because the IRO process binds HMOs to provide benefits
that the IRO mandates, the IRO's decision supersedes the
medical judgment of the HMO's physician or the treating
physician as to the determination of medical necessity.131
III.

LIMITING

HMO

ACCOUNTABILITY: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
CORPORATE HEALTH

A. ConflictingDecisions Create Uncertainty Over External Review
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Corporate Health is of extreme
importance.13
This decision could compel courts to subject

131. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538-39 (determining that the independent
review provisions "establish a quasi-administrative procedure for the review of
such denial and bind the ERISA plan to the decision of the independent review
organization"). The court addresses the FEHBA preemption as it did the ERISA
preemption, holding that the provisions of the THCLA that do not "relate to"
ERISA plans, likewise would not "relate to" any FEHBA plans. Id. at 539.
Consequently, the FEHBA plans would preempt the independent review
provisions that would be preempted under ERISA. Id.
Finally, the court
determined that the IRO provisions are so independent that they are severable
from the remainder of the THCLA. Id. at 540.
132. Corporate Health Ins. Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 645 (5th
Cir. 2000) (affirming the original panel decision that the IRO provisions
conflicted with ERISA's exclusive remedy and cannot be saved by the savings
clause).
133. Id. at 643.
134. Id. at 644.
135. Id.
136. Young, supra note 106, at 1279 (characterizing this issue as important
because several states have independent review statutes, and Corporate Health
directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram).

808

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 50:765

137
other states' external review provisions to close scrutiny.
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Seventh Circuit, in
Moran v. Rush Pnidential,18 held that ERISA did not preempt an
Illinois independent review statute.' 39 The Seventh Circuit's
Moran decision directly contravenes the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Corporate Health.'40
The Seventh Circuit held that the
independent review mechanism in the Illinois HMO Act was part
of the insurance contract and, therefore, not preempted under
ERISA.14 1 In addition, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are in
conflict with the Fifth Circuit because they have held that state
insurance laws become part of an ERISA plan, but may only be
enforced with an ERISA Suit. 4 2 Congress could act to alleviate
this conflict by enacting a Patients' Bill of Rights to protect
health care consumers through external review provisions, as
well as amending ERISA to provide a cause of action for state
43

law remedies.

The Fifth Circuit's Corporate Health decision could damage
existing external review laws. 14 4 This decision affects the states'
rights to enforce their insurance laws and to protect the health
137. Id. As of October 26, 2000, thirty-eight states plus the District of
Columbia have some form of independent external review process, binding or
non-binding. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 27, Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., (2001) (No. 00-665) (on
file with CatholicUniversity Law Review).
138. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 969 (holding that ERISA's savings clause applied to Illinois's
independent review provisions and saved the law from ERISA preemption).
140. Id. at 973 (Posner, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Seventh
Circuit's decision "creates a square conflict with another circuit, [which] is very
probably unsound, and will affect an enormous number of cases"); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 14,
Montemayor (No. 00-665) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Moran
directly conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corporate Health); Chad
Bowman, Illinois HMO External Review Law Upheld by Federal Court Against
ERISA Challenge, 00 Pension & Benefits Daily (BNA) No. 205, at 1 (Oct. 23,
2000) (on file with Catholic University Law Review) (noting the direct conflict
between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits).
141. Moran, 230 F.3d at 969-70.
142. Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a saved insurance law will govern the interpretation of the insurance
contract, but does not affect preemption of the state law remedies); Ruble v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 913 F.2d 295, 297 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
terms of the insurance contract are modified by the saved insurance law, but
nonetheless enforcement of the policy is under ERISA).
143. Fischer, supra note 14, at 90.
144. Machiz, supra note 30, at 1186.
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of their citizens.14546 The Fifth Circuit's reasoning contains several
significant flaws.

B. Corporate Health MisinterpretsPilot Life
The Supreme Court could address concerns regarding ERISA
preemption more efficiently by clarifying two of its important and
relevant decisions. 147 First, the Court should answer specific
unresolved questions regarding Pilot Life14" and ERISA's
exclusive remedy, specifically whether ERISA is the sole
149
enforcement mechanism for aggrieved patients' claims.
Second, the Court should clarify relevant language in Pegram v.
Herdrich'5 0 that commentators have interpreted to hold that
mixed eligibility decisions made by physicians concerning both
coverage and medical treatment necessarily involve the
of medical facts and should be resolved under state
assessment
1
law.

1

1. Qualificationof the Solicitor General's Argument in Pilot Life
In Corporate Health, the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA
preempted the external review provision of the THCLA despite
the court's determination that the law fell under ERISA's

145. Texas Seeks Supreme Court Appeal of Decision Striking HMO Review
Law, 00 Pension & Benefits Daily (BNA) No. 212 (Nov. 1, 2000) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review) (summarizing the State of Texas's argument
regarding independent review provisions).
146. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the Supreme Court of the United
States at 17-22, Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., (2001) (No. 00-665);
see also Machiz, supra note 30, at 1186-89 (analyzing the Texas Department of
Insurance's petition); Young, supra note 106, at 1277-78 (analyzing the IRO in
relation to the ERISA "savings" clause).
147. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the Supreme Court of the United
States at 18-19, Montemayor (No. 00-665) (arguing that by accepting certiorari,
the Supreme Court could have the opportunity to address the interpretations of
Pilot Life and Pegram, and thereby determine the impact of these decisions on
CorporateHealth).
148. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 (determining whether ERISA § 502(a) provides
the exclusive remedy that preempts state insurance law remedies that the
savings clause would otherwise save).
149. ERISA§ 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
150. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
151. Id. at 229, 235; see, e.g., Machiz, supra note 30, at 1187 (summarizing
the arguments that the Texas Department of Insurance presented in its
rehearing petitions in light of Pegram).
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insurance "savings" clause. 52 The court reasoned that because
the independent review provisions conflicted with a substantive
provision of ERISA, ERISA preempted the independent review
law. 153
In Pilot Life, the Court determined that Mississippi's bad faith
law was not an insurance law subject to ERISA's "savings"
clause. 54 This finding sufficiently resolved the issue for the
specific cause of action, but the Court continued to discuss
whether ERISA contained an exclusive remedy provision. 5 5 In
amicus curiae for Pilot Life, the Solicitor General of the United
States argued that Congress intended § 502(a) of ERISA to be
the exclusive remedy for participants and beneficiaries claiming
improper processing of benefit claims. 56 The Solicitor General
concluded that state causes of action under § 502(a) would
interfere with Congress's intent that ERISA's remedy be
exclusive. 57 The Court, in Pilot Life, agreed and determined that
the language and structure of ERISA § 502(a) and Congress's
intent for it to have the same exclusive remedy provision as 58
§
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA)

152. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538-39.
153. Id. The court relied on dicta in the Supreme Court's Pilot Life decision.
Id.; see also PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 50.
154. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (determining that Mississippi's law of bad faith
does not fit within the common sense understanding of "regulates insurance" or
the McCarran-Ferguson factors).
155. See id. at 51-52 (finding that the understanding and interpretation of
the savings clause must be informed by legislative intent concerning the civil
enforcement provisions provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)).
156. Id. at 52, 54 (concluding that Congress intended for ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies to be exclusive as indicated by the deliberate care with
which Congress drafted ERISA's civil enforcement remedies and the balancing
of policies): see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-19,
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868) (arguing
that the notice-prejudice rule does not conflict with ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme); supra note 96 and accompanying text.
157. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 (claiming that state causes of action for
claims under ERISA § 502(a) would "pose an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress"); see also Brief for the United States at 18-19, UNUM Life
(No. 97-1868).
158. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52; see also Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). The preemptive force of § 301 of the
LMRA displaced all state actions for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization, even when the state action purported to authorize a
remedy unavailable under the federal provision. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55-56
(summarizing the LMRA preemptive provision).
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supported this analysis. 5 9
Subsequently, in UNUM Life Insurance,160 the Solicitor General
qualified his argument in Pilot Life by highlighting that the law
at issue in that case was not a law regulating insurance.1 1 The
Solicitor General also explained that § 301 of LMRA, the statute
considered the model to ERISA § 502(a) in Pilot Life, "does not
contain any statutory exception analogous to ERISA's insurance
savings provision. ,,162
In essence, the Solicitor General
contended that the relevant sections of ERISA and LMRA are two
statutes with different provisions.1 63 The LMRA, unlike ERISA,
64
does not exempt certain laws from its preemption provisions.
The Solicitor General concluded that ERISA's insurance
"savings" clause explicitly "saves state law conferring causes of
insurance, just as it
action or affecting remedies that regulate
65
laws."'
mandated-benefits
does state
The Court in UNUM Life Insurance acknowledged the Solicitor
General's qualified argument, but clarified that UNUM Life
Insurance does not raise this issue, and the Court consequently
does not need to address the Solicitor General's argument to
reach the proper conclusion. 166 The Court further clarified that
In sum, the
Pilot Life did not interpret the "savings" clause.
Court did not disagree with the Solicitor General's qualified
argument, but left open the possibility of consideration in a
future case.1 68
Now is the perfect time for the Court to return to Pilot Life and

159. Pilot Life. 481 U.S. at 52. The Court determined that "Congress' specific
reference to § 301 of the LMRA to describe the civil enforcement scheme of
ERISA makes clear its intention that all suits brought by beneficiaries or
participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated
plans be treated as federal questions governed by [ERISA § 502(a)." Id. at 56.
160. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
161. Id. at 376 n.7.
162. Brief for the United States at 25, UNUM Life (No. 97-1868).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 23; see also UNUM Life, 526 U.S. at 377 n7.
166. UNUM Life, 526 U.S. at 377 n.7.
167. Id. (clarifying that Pilot Life "concerned Mississippi common law, [which]
creat[ed] a cause of action for bad faith breach of contract, law not specifically
directed to the insurance industry and therefore not saved from ERISA
preemption").
168. See id.
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clarify its interpretation of the exclusivity of ERISA § 502(a). 69
The Court must clarify language that is not essential to the
holding in Pilot Life because it already has determined that
ERISA preempted the Mississippi bad faith law by concluding
that it did not fall under the "savings" provision. Consequently,
170
the Court could clarify Pilot Life without overturning it.
Essentially, the Court needs to acknowledge that the exclusivity
of ERISA § 502(a)7 remains separate from the insurance "savings"
'
clause analysis.
This is an important distinction because of the way in which
the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Pilot
Life.7 2 These courts interpreted Pilot Life to hold that ERISA §
502 precludes the operation of the "savings" clause when state
insurance law remedies are at issue. 173 These courts, however,
have failed to recognize that the insurance "savings" clause is a
distinct exemption 74from preemption and not subject to other
sections of ERISA.1
2. Interpretationof ERISA's "Savings"Clause
ERISA's "savings" clause completely exempts laws that
regulate insurance.'7 5 The express language of the "savings"
clause states that "nothing in this subchapter [ERISA] shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any

169. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 18-19, Montemayor (No. 00-665); see also Machiz, supra note 30, at
1186-87 (noting that the "conflict" preemption portion of Pilot Life "stands on
shaky ground"); Young, supra note 106, at 1279 (stating CorporateHealth "begs
for review" by the United States Supreme Court).
170. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 18-19, Montemayor (No. 00-665).
171. Machiz, supra note 30, at 1188-89 (addressing the various avenues
available for attacking Pilot Life); Young, supra note 106, at 1277-78.
172. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 5389 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the IRO provisions of the THCLA interfere with
the exclusivity of ERISA § 502 as discussed in Pilot Life); Kanne v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a group
health policy was part of the ERISA plan, and, therefore, the state common and
statutory law claims against the insurer were preempted); Anschultz v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467, 1469 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding
that claims by the insured against the insurer for damages under Florida law
for alleged wrongful denial of long term disability benefits were preempted).
173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174. ERISA§ 514(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
175. See id.; Machlz, supra note 30, at 1188.
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,,176

State which regulates insurance.
The Corporate Health court
held that ERISA did not preempt the independent review
1 77
provisions of the THCLA under the "savings" clause analysis.
The court should have stopped there, but instead, became
distracted by the language in Pilot Life, which suggested that
ERISA be the exclusive remedy.'7 8 The language in Pilot Life
contradicts the express language of the "savings" clause, which
provides that nothing in ERISA may interfere with the regulation
71 9
of insurance, including ERISA § 502's remedial scheme.
Congress explicitly included the "savings" clause to save laws
that regulate insurance from ERISA preemption. 180
The
exclusion is not limited to only state laws that do not create
another remedy.' 8 ' The "savings" clause analysis, therefore, is
inconsistent with the holding in Corporate Health. 82
By
accepting certiorari, the Court has the opportunity in
Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. to revisit Pilot
Life and reconsider the
conclusion that ERISA § 502 should be
83
the exclusive remedy.

3. CongressionalIntent
In Corporate Health, the Fifth Circuit found that ERISA
preempted the independent review provisions even though the
state law in question regulated insurance, and the court
concluded that the state law fell under the "savings" clause
exception in ERISA. 8 4 Nevertheless, the court based its holding

176. 29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(A).
177. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538 (finding that the IRO provisions
satisfied the common sense test for regulating insurance and two of the
McCarran-Ferguson factors). The court found that failure to meet all three of
the McCarran-Ferguson factors "is not fatal to Texas's saving clause claim." Id.
178. Id. at 538-39 (concluding that "even if the (IRO] provisions would
otherwise be saved, they may nonetheless be preempted if they conflict with a
substantive provision of ERISA").
179. Machiz, supranote 30, at 1188.
180. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 12, Montemayor (No. 00-665).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
182. See CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538-39; see also supra note 176 and
accompanying text; Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States at 12, 14-15, Montemayor (No. 00-665).
183. Id.
184. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 538-39.
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on Pilot Life's description of "field preemption. ' , 85 The Pilot Life
Court determined that even if the "savings" clause saved a cause
of action, ERISA could still preempt the law if it conflicted with
Congress's express
intent that the remedies contained in ERISA
86
be exclusive.

When Congress passed ERISA in 1974, it explicitly intended to
create an exemption provision for state insurance regulatory
schemes. 187 This "field preemption" undermines the entire
purpose of the "savings" clause by preempting insurance
provisions that Congress intended to fall under the "savings"
clause, virtually rendering the "savings" clause meaningless. 8 8
In addition, Pilot Life contends that Congress clearly intended
for ERISA's supposedly comprehensive remedial scheme to be
exclusive.' 89 A textual reading of this ERISA provision provides
no support for this conclusion.' 90 The "provision merely creates
a cause of action to enforce the terms of a plan which can
include an insurance policy or HMO subscription agreement; its
words say nothing about exclusivity. " "'
In addition, a 1989 House Budget Committee report reveals
Congress's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's Pilot Life
opinion. 192
This dissatisfaction stems from the numerous
complaints and inquiries it received about improper denial of
medical claims. 93 Some complaints have alleged that Pilot Life,
which interprets ERISA as preempting state laws that allow
remedies in connection with claims for benefits, denies legal
194
recourse to participants in and beneficiaries of ERISA plans.
The 1989 House Budget Committee similarly believes that "the
legislative history of ERISA ... support[s] the view that Congress

185.

Id.: Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.

186. PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 52.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994); see also supra notes 175-83 and
accompanying text.
188. Young, supra note 106, at 1277-78.
189. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52 (relying on the language and structure of §
502(a), as well as legislative history).
190. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (1994); see also supra note 96
and accompanying text.
191. Machlz, supra note 30, at 1188; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
192. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 55-56 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1947-48.
193. Id.
194. Id.

20011

CorporateHealth v. Texas Departmentof Insurance

815

intended for the courts to develop a Federal common law with
respect to employee benefit plans, including the development of
appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically
enumerated in section 502 of ERISA. , 95 The Committee
concluded that federal courts have the authority to provide
remedies based on the specific facts of cases before them, even if
the remedy is not enumerated in ERISA. 96 For these reasons,
the Supreme Court should revisit this issue and clarify its
holding in Pilot Life, while simultaneously
enforcing state health
97
care consumer protection schemes. 1

C. Corporate Health in Light of Pegram v. Herdrich
The District court in Corporate Health misinterpreted the
98
Supreme
Court's
decision
in
Pegram v.
Herdrich.'
Commentators read Pegram to hold that coverage and medical
necessity decisions, which are so inextricably combined,
constitute "mixed eligibility" decisions. 99 These "mixed eligibility
decisions

.

.

.

involve the exercise of medical judgment to

determine the treatment a patient needs."20 0 Pegram held that
medical necessity decisions are medical in nature and the states
are free to regulate those decisions through their medical
malpractice laws. 201
External review provisions allow an
independent physician unaffiliated with the MCO to decide
whether care is medically necessary.0 2 Although Pegram is not
195. Id. at 1948; see also Radici v. Associated Ins. Co., 217 F.3d 737, 743-44
(9th Cir. 2000) (discussing House Report 10 1-247 on COBRA benefits).
196. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 55-56 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 1947-48.
197. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 21, 26-27, Montemayor (No. 00-665); see also Machiz, supra note 30,
at 1186, 1188 (noting that many states have adopted external review
mechanisms, and ERISA does not provide comparable consumer protection);
Young, supra note 106, at 1279.
198. Corporate Health, 220 F.3d at 643 (concluding that Pegram did not
protect state law claims from preemption if they are a mixed eligibility decision);
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (holding that the HMO's mixed
treatment and eligibility decisions were not subject to ERISA's fiduciary
standards).
199. Young, supra note 106, at 1267, 1269-70.
200. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
at 22, Montemayor (No. 00-665); see also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
201. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235.
202. GERALDINE DALLEK & KAREN POLLITZ, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HEALTH PLAN
DECISIONS: AN UPDATE 1 (2000) (on file with Catholic University Law Review)
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a preemption case, the Court noted that Congress did not intend
203
The
for ERISA to preempt general state health care regulation.
Court's analysis impacts independent review processes because
the review addresses the central issue of health care regulation:
whether medical treatment is necessary.20 4
Under Pegram's analysis, the states should be free to regulate
these decisions with their independent review provisions. °5
Pegram clarifies ERISA's preemption provision by suggesting
that ERISA does not preempt laws providing for review of
coverage decisions based on medical judgment. 206 Therefore, the
Corporate Health court incorrectly held that ERISA preempted
the IRO provisions because these "mixed eligibility decisions" are
the decisions that the IRO process reviews. °7 The IRO provisions
of the THCLA address the critical issue of whether treatment is
medically necessary. °8
IV.

CONCLUSION

The function of independent review for the benefit of health
care consumers in the insurance community is critical. Concern
that ERISA thwarts valuable health care protections is
increasing, thereby making health care consumers more
vulnerable to denials of care and an ineffective appeals process.
As the managed care environment becomes more complex,
adequate steps must be taken to hold managed care entities
accountable for their decisions to deny treatment.
Unless ERISA is amended, state law must take the steps to
hold MCOs accountable. The CorporateHealth decision reflects
the clash between legitimate state consumer protection schemes

(Geraldine Dallek and Karen Pollitz are affiliated with the Institute for Health
Care Research and Policy at Georgetown University and prepared the review for
the Kaiser Family Foundation.).
203. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237.
204. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States at 21-22, Montemayor (No. 00-665).
205. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235.
206. Id. at 236.
207. CorporateHealth, 220 F.3d at 643-44; Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235-36.
208. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
at 25, Montemayor (No. 00-665) (citing Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154). "The
purpose of the IRO process is to decide whether the MCO correctly determined
the appropriate medical response to a given patient's constellation of
symptoms." DALLEK & POLLITZ, supra note 202, at 1, 9.
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for independent review and the powerful and overwhelming
Effectively clarifying ERISA
effect of ERISA preemption.
preemption and the effect of the "savings" clause, specifically in
remains a feasible solution, which would end this
Pilot Life,
20 9
conflict.

209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
at 12, Montemayor (No. 00-665).
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